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Abstract
Multiagent systems require techniques for effec-
tively allocating resources or tasks to amongagents
in a group. Auctionsare onemethodfor structuring
communication of agents’ private values for the re-
sourceortask to a centraldecisionmaker. Different
auction methods vary in their communication re-
quirements. This paper makes three contributions
to the understanding the types of group decision
making for which auctions are apprpriate meth-
ods. First, it shows that entropy is the best measure
of communication bandwidth used by an auction
in messages bidders send and receive. Second, it
presents a method for measuring bandwidth usage;
the dialogue trees used for this computation are a
new and compact representation of the probablity
distributionof everypossibledialoguebetweentwo
agents. Third, it presents new guidelines for choos-
ing the best auction, guidelines which differ signif-
icantly from recommendations in prior work. The
new guidelinesare basedon detailed analysis of the
communicationrequirementsof Sealed-bid,Dutch,
Staged, Japanese, and Bisection auctions. In con-
tradistinctiontopreviouswork,theguidelinesshow
that the auction that minimizes bandwidth depends
onboththenumberofbiddersandthesample space
from which bidders’ valuations are drawn.
1 Introduction
Multiagent system designers can achieve signiﬁcant cost sav-
ings by making the correct choice of algorithm for team de-
cision making. The results in this paper show that no single
auction type minimizes bandwidth usage for all team sizes
or for all possible valuations for the resource. For instance,
Sealed-bidauctionsrequiretheleastcommunicationforsmall
problems. The Dutch, Staged, and Bisection auctions each
require least communication in some situations.
A Sealed-bid auction requires each bidder and the auction-
eer to exchange 5 bits of information in a system with 60
agents where each agent’s valuation is drawn independently
and uniformly from the range $1 to $32. A Dutch auction re-
quiresanexchangeofapproximatelyonebitonaverageunder
the same assumptions. A difference of four bits of informa-
tion may seem insigniﬁcant by today’s standards but modern
systems may make millions or billions of related team deci-
sions every second. While sacriﬁcing no team decision qual-
ity, a system designer could save over 80 percent of its com-
munication bandwidth just by implementing a different set of
auction rules.
Previous work has made recommendations for the best
choice of auction for making group decisions. However, the
assumptionsthatled to thoserecommendationsareincompat-
ible with real systems in which communication bandwidth is
costly, such as those using Internet-like networks.
This paper makes three main contributions to the under-
standing of communication for decision making in multia-
gent systems. First, we argue for entropy as the metric of
communication bandwidth used by all messages exchanged.
Communication in any multiagent system is made up of a se-
ries of messages that one agent sends to another. System de-
signers need to choose an encoding for messages. For exam-
ple, the number nine is commonly given the binary encoding
“1001” but in ASCII code it is assigned the binary encoding
“0011 1001”. Measuring communication in decision-making
algorithms using a particular message encoding could lead to
results that are applicable only for that encoding. This paper
uses principles of Information Theory to measure informa-
tion in a coding-independentway. The receiver of a message
can generatea probabilitydistribution over the set of possible
messages it can receive. The entropy of that distribution is
a lower bound on the average size of the encoding for each
message.
Second, we providedetails of a three-stepmethod for mea-
suring bandwidth used by an algorithm. In the ﬁrst step, the
analyst builds a dialogue tree that represents all possible se-
quences of messages exchanged between the auctioneer and
each bidder. In the second step, the edges of the dialogue tree
arelabeledwiththeprobabilityassociatedwitheachmessage.
Finally, in the third step, the expected information in the dia-
logue is calculated using the tree representation.
Third, we apply the analysis to Sealed-bid, Dutch (de-
scending), Japanese (ascending), Staged (ascending), and
Bisection auctions and provides system designers with the
knowledge necessary to choose the auction that minimizes
communication bandwidth. Auctions are particularly attrac-
tive for multiagent decision making because they provide away to structure the allocation of a resource or task to the
member of a multiagent system that values it most, when the
resource’s value is private to each group member. Equiva-
lently, auctions are used to assign a task to the member of
a group that is best suited to perform it when the suitability
of each group member to the task is private [Hunsberger and
Grosz, 2000; Rauenbusch, 2004].
Our recommendations, based on a minimizing commu-
nication requirements, differ from those of economists and
computer scientists. Economic analysis typically ignores
communication costs entirely. Some computer scientists
[Shoham and Tennenholtz, 2001] have focused on prefer-
ence revelation, which concerns the willingness to disclose
information. They consider only those messages sent from
a bidder to an auctioneer and ignore message sent in the op-
posite direction. Some researchers [Grigorieva et al., 2002]
have used communication complexity or other metrics that
assume a particular message encoding. Their results may
be misleading for measuring bandwidth requirements in sys-
tems that employ more efﬁcient encodings—our results are
coding-independent.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the sin-
gle item allocation problem is formally deﬁned, and the ﬁve
auctions are described. Next, Section 3 details the process
for measuring communication in a dialogue using Dialogue
Trees. Section 4 describes the application of dialogue trees to
auctions. Guidelines for system designers choosing auction
rules that minimize communication are given in Section 5.
Section 6 highlights important related work and Section 7
gives conclusions and suggests areas for future work.
2 Item Allocation and Auctions
A single-item allocation problem is characterized by a group
of n bidder agents and a seller agent (also called the auction-
eer) that possesses a single, atomic item. Each bidder has
a value for the item that is private and drawn independently
and uniformly from the set of integers from 0 to 2R − 1 in-
clusive. Another way to look at a bidder’s value is that it
is being drawn from one of 2R bins. The distribution from
which each bidder’s value is drawn is common knowledge.
Bidder i’s value is denoted by xi. The goal of the seller is
to allocate the task to the bidder with the highest value. If
there is a tie for the highest value, the task may be allocated
to any of the bidders with the highest value. A solution to a
single-item allocation problem is the index i, where xi is the
maximum value among all n bidders.
We analyze ﬁve auction types: Sealed-bid, Japanese,
Staged, Dutch, and Bisection. This particular list of ﬁve auc-
tion types is representative of the range of auctions typically
usedtoallocatea singleitemandis notintendedtobeexhaus-
tive. For reference, the rest of this section provides a descrip-
tion of each auction type. Rauenbusch [2004] provides more
detail, including pseudocode for each. In each auction, we
assume bidders are honest. Prices are used to structure com-
munication with the bidders and not as a tool for building in
incentives for honesty.
Sealed-bid. All bidders send their value to the auctioneer.
The winner is the bidder that sends the highest value.
Japanese (Ascending). The auctioneer maintains a current
price, initially set to 0. The auctioneer sends each bidder in
turn the current price. If a bidder’s value is greater than or
equaltothecurrentprice,itsendsamessageafﬁrmingitscon-
tinued participation in the auction. Otherwise, it sends a mes-
sage indicating its desire to leave the auction. The auctioneer
then increments the current price, and repeats the process. If
only one participating bidder remains in the auction after a
round, the auction ends and that remaining bidder is the win-
ner. If no participating bidders remain, the winner is chosen
from the bidders in the previous round. Once a bidder leaves
the auction, it may not rejoin.
Staged (Ascending). The auctioneer maintains a current
price, initially set to 0. In Stage 1, the auctioneer sends bid-
der 1 the current price. If the bidder’s value is greater than
or equal to the current price, it sends its value and the current
price is updated to this value. Otherwise, it sends a message
indicating its desire to leave the auction. The auctioneer then
moves on to Stage 2, sends the current price to bidder 2, and
theprocessrepeats. Theauctioneercontinuesinthiswaywith
eachbidderandthe processends afterthe nthstage. The win-
ner is the last bidder that did not leave the auction.
Dutch (Descending). The auctioneer maintains a current
price, initially set to 2R − 1. The auctioneer sends each bid-
der in turn the current price. The bidder sends a message
indicating whether its value is equal to the current price. If
no bidder’s value is equal to the current price, the auctioneer
decrements the price and repeats. If one or more bidder has
value equal to the current price, the auctioneer chooses one
as the winner.
Bisection. The auctioneer maintains an lower bound de-
noted l and upper bound denoted u, initially set to 0 and 2R,
respectively. The auctioneer also maintains a list of active
bidders, initially the set of all bidders. The auctioneer calcu-
lates the current price as u− u−l
2 . The auctioneer sends each
bidder in turn the current price. Each bidder sends a message
of either“Yes” or“No” to indicatewhetherits valueis greater
thanorequalto thecurrentprice. Ifthereare twoormorebid-
ders that sent a “Yes” message, the lower bound is updated to
the current price, the set of active bidders updated to include
only those that sent a “Yes” message, and the process repeats.
If nobiddersent a “Yes”message, the upperboundis updated
with the current price and the procedure repeats. If one bid-
der sent a “Yes” message, that bidder is declared the winner
and the procedure ends. If the upper bound and lower bound
differ by only one, one of the active bidders is chosen as the
winner. After ﬁndinga winner,typicallythebisection auction
may proceed into a “price determination”phase that provides
incentives for honesty. Because we assume honesty, the price
determination phase is omitted from our analysis.Encoding Probability
Message Enc1 Enc2 AlgA AlgB
a 0000 0 0.0625 0.99
b 0001 10001 0.0625 0.000333
c 0010 10010 0.0625 0.000333
d 0011 10011 0.0625 0.000333
... ... ... ... ...
p 0011 10011 0.0625 0.000333
Table 1: Two encodings for sixteen messages used by Algo-
rithms AlgA and AlgB
3 Communication Properties of a Dialogue
This section serves three main purposes. First, it presents an
argument for the use of entropy and information theory to
measure communication for team decision making. Second,
it highlights the need to consider all communication. In auc-
tions, this means that complete analysis requires evaluating
communication in two directions: both from the bidders to
the auctioneer and from the auctioneer to the bidders. Third,
it presents dialogue trees—a tool for using entropy to mea-
sure the expected information transmitted in successive mes-
sages between agents. It details the use of dialogue trees in
measuring communication for team decision making.
3.1 Entropy: Metric for Measuring
Communication
A metric for measuring communication is required to com-
pare auction rules by their communication cost. In each auc-
tion, information is exchanged between the auctioneer and
each bidder by sending and receiving messages. In any im-
plementation of an auction, the center and the bidders must
agree to an encoding of messages.
Measuring information required by a multiagent algorithm
using a particular encoding for messages may lead to mis-
leading results. To illustrate why, we refer to the example
given in Table 1. The columns labeled Enc1 and Enc2 shows
two possible encodings for each of sixteen messages labeled
a through p. Two algorithms, labeled AlgA and AlgB, each
require one of sixteen messages to be sent from one agent to
another but they differ in the frequencywith which each mes-
sage is sent. The probability associated with each message
for each algorithm is shown in the two rightmost columns of
the table.
With encodingEnc1, bothAlgA andAlgB requirefourbits
to transmit the message. But with encoding Enc2, AlgA re-
quires 4.75 bits and AlgB requires 1.04 bits in expectation.
Therefore, the algorithm that requires the least communica-
tiondependsontheencodingchosen. Just asin thistoyexam-
ple, conclusions about the communication properties of auc-
tions using a particular encoding are misleading because it
is not clear whether those conclusions hold for other possi-
ble encodings. Work in Information Theory [Shannon, 1948;
Cover and Thomas, 1991] has shown that the entropy of a
random variable describing a message is a lower bound on
the average size of the encoding for that message. Rather
than evaluate an algorithm using a particular encoding, we
therefore use entropy to measure expected information com-
municated.
3.2 Direction of Communication
It is convenient to distinguish between coordination mes-
sages, which are those sent by the auctioneer to a bidder,
from revelation messages, which are those sent by the bid-
der to the auctioneer. In this paper, the communication costs
associated with coordination and with revelation are consid-
ered when calculating the expected information transmitted
in an auction. In particular, the results provided are for the
sum of coordination and revelation costs. This assumption
is supported by Internet-like computer networks in which in-
creased bandwidth requires costs associated with increased
infrastructure for both directions of communication.
In a Sealed-bid auction, each bidder always reveals its
value. Therefore, Sealed-bid auctions have the highest band-
width requirements for revelation messages. As the results in
Section 5 indicate, it would be misleading to rely on revela-
tion messages alone when choosing an auction. Even though
Sealed-bid auctions require more information transmitted in
revelation than any other auction, they require no coordina-
tion. For that reason, they have low communication require-
ments in settings with small teams and coarse distributions
from which bidders’ values are drawn.
3.3 Dialogue Trees
A dialogue is a sequence of messages sent from one agent
to another agent, in which the agent that sends the odd-
numbered messages receives the even-numbered messages.
Dialogue trees simplify the construction of a probabilistic
model of the messages. In this section, we describe dialogue
trees and provide a detailed method for calculating the ex-
pected information in a dialogue. We use dialogue trees to
measureexpectedinformationin anauctionsbyanalyzingthe
dialogue between the auctioneer and each bidder. Dialogue
trees apply equally to other dialogues and are not limited to
analysis of auctions.
A dialogue tree is a tree data structure with labeled edges.
Each node represents a message, and is labeled with the mes-
sage it represents. Query messages are those sent by the auc-
tioneer to request a message from the bidder; reply messages
are those sent by the bidder. Status messages are those sent
by the auctioneer to which no reply is expected. Figures that
represent dialoguetrees (such as Figure 1) show query nodes,
reply nodes, and status nodes enclosed by circles, boxes, and
diamonds,respectively. Nodes(d) denotestheset ofall nodes
in dialogue tree d.
The children of a node in a dialogue tree represent the
sample space from which the next message is drawn, given
that the message represented by the parent node has been
sent. Children(m) denotes the set of child nodes of node
m. Parent(m) denotes the parent node of node m.
A label on an edge between a parent and child node indi-
cates the receiver’s belief, prior to receiving the message, that
the message represented by the child node is the one that the
senderwill send. In(m) denotestheedgelabelthatis incident
on node m in a dialogue tree.The edge labels deﬁne a probability distribution over the
sample space represented by the children. The probability
distribution and sample space together deﬁne a probabilistic
model for messages in a dialogue.
In the auctions described in this paper, a bidder always
sends a reply after receiving a query; therefore, a query node
is nevera leaf in a dialoguetree. A replynode maybe either a
leaf or a non-leaf node, dependingon whether the center may
follow the corresponding reply message with a message. A
status node is always a leaf in a dialogue tree.
The remainder of this section details how a dialogue tree is
used to calculate the expected information in a dialogue. The
procedure uses edge labels for two purposes: to calculate the
information content of a node and to calculate the probability
of visiting a node.
The information content (IC) of node m is the entropy of
the random variable represented by the labels of all edges
originating at the node. Formally,
IC(m) = −
X
c∈Children(m)
In(c)logIn(c) (1)
A leaf node therefore has information content of 0.
A path from the root node to each leaf node represents
every possible dialogue between the two agents. The amount
of information in a dialogue is the sum of the information
content in each node on the path. Each of the possible di-
alogues represented by a tree has a different probability of
occurring. This probability is the product of the edge labels
along the path of the dialogue from the root of the tree to
a leaf. The probability of visiting (PV) node m (that is, the
probability that a message represented by a particular node
will be sent in a dialogue) is the product of the probability of
the message represented by its parent node and the label on
its incident edge. There is unit probability of visiting the root
node. Formally,
PV(m) =
￿
1 if m is root
PV(Parent(m)) · In(m) otherwise (2)
The contributed information (CI) of a node m is the prod-
uct of the amount of information represented by the node and
the probability the node is visited. Formally,
CI(m) = PV(m)IC(m) (3)
We use expected information in a dialogue as the metric
for communication. Expected information of a dialogue (EI)
represented by dialogue tree d is the sum of the contributed
information of each node in d. Formally,
EI(d) =
X
m∈Nodes(d)
CI(m) (4)
Contributed information provides a straightforward way to
separate the informationcontribution of messages sent by the
center from those sent by the bidder. The child nodes of a re-
ply node represent messages sent by the center and the child
nodes of a query node represent messages sent by the bidder.
The amount of information sent by the bidder is the sum of
thecontributedinformationofallquerynodesandtheamount
of informationsent by the center is the sum of the contributed
information of all reply nodes. This is counter-intuitive and
arises because contributed information of each node is de-
rived from the probabilities associated with the edges origi-
nating at that node, which deﬁne the information content of
the messages represented by its child nodes. Section 4 de-
scribes the dialogue tree in Figure 1 and how it is used to
analyze the Bisection auction.
4 Analysis of Auctions
Using dialogue trees as a tool, in each auction we ﬁrst deter-
mine the structure of the tree, then calculate the appropriate
edgelabels. Toaid indeterminingthestructureofthetree, the
messages in each of the ﬁve auctions are divided into the fol-
lowing two types of query/response pairs: (1) best response,
and (2) value. In a best response query, the auctioneer sends
the bidder a message that includes a price. The bidder then
responds with the message Yes if its value is higher than the
priceandthemessageNootherwise. Inavaluequery,theauc-
tioneer sends a message, and the bidder responds by sending
a message containing its value.
Decomposing these algorithms into two types of con-
stituent query/response pairs is a tool used to simplify of the
analysis. The measurement of the expected information in a
dialogue for each auction is independent of this decomposi-
tion. For example, if a bidder in the Staged auction responds
Yes when sent the ﬁrst message, it always sends its value. It
is therefore not necessary to send a query message for the
bidder’s value after receiving the response. But, there is zero
communication cost for the value query (because the proba-
bility of sending it given a Yes response is 1).
Two methods are used to determine the edge labels. The
ﬁrst and simplest way to determine the edge labels is by sim-
ulation. An auction is run many times in simulation, and
the frequency of each message is recorded and used for the
edge labels. The main advantageof this approachis that it re-
quires little labor, after coding the algorithm. One disadvan-
tage of the simulation method is that the time required to run
the many simulations needed to accurately estimate the fre-
quency of low-probability messages usually found near the
leaves of the dialogue tree may be prohibitive. In addition,
this method requires a different simulation for each setting of
parameters of interest. For example, the results given in Fig-
ure 2 would require 1220 sets of simulations: one for each of
122 team sizes and 10 settings for the number of bins.
The second method is to calculate the edge labels ana-
lytically. This approach uses the common knowledge from
which the bidder’s value is drawn, and the knowledge ac-
quired through messages represented by higher levels of the
tree. The main drawback with this approach is that it is labor
intensive because an analyst must reason about the receiver’s
mental model for each message in each algorithm. The main
advantage of this approach is that the procedure for generat-
ing edge labels in one particular setting (e.g., for a team of 20
agents and 4 bins) applies equally well to other settings (e.g.,
21 agents and 8 bins) by substituting appropriate parameters.
An additional advantage is that the edge labels are calculated
precisely rather than estimated.8
No
0.5
Yes
0.5
4
0.125
Stop
0.875
Assign
0.125
12
0.875
No
0.5
Yes
0.5
No
0.5
Yes
0.5
2
0.125
Stop
0.875
Assign
0.125
6
0.875
10
0.339
Stop
0.661
Assign
0.339
14
0.661
Figure 1: Highest three levels of a dialogue tree for Bisection
auction with four bidders and sixteen bins
The results presented in this paper were based on generat-
ing edge labels using the second method. The ﬁrst method
was used to verify the results. The rest of this section pro-
vides an example of a dialogue tree for the Bisection auction
to illustrate the use of dialogue trees to measure the expected
amount of information transmitted in the ﬁve auctions. De-
tails of the analysis have been omitted due to lack of space.
Rauenbusch [2004] provides the details of the analysis of the
dialogue trees for each auction.
The calculation of the edge labels in any dialogue tree in-
volves reasoning about the knowledge of the receiver of each
message: the distribution from which the bidder’s value is
drawn and all messages represented in higher levels of the
tree. Figure 1 shows the dialogue tree that represents the ﬁrst
ﬁve messages exchangedbetweenthe auctioneerandonebid-
der in a Bisection auction. In the tree, the message containing
the best response querywith value b is representedby a query
node with label b.
To provide an example of the reasoning involved in com-
puting edge labels, we speciﬁcally consider the edges on the
path from the root node labeled 8 to the leaf node labeled 14.
Calculation of edge labels in the ﬁgure assumes that there are
four bidders, with values drawn from 16 bins—0 through 15
inclusive.
The root of the tree corresponds to the best response query
with value 8. The bidder replies to this query with Yes if its
value is greater than or equal to 8, and No otherwise. The re-
ceiver of the Yes or No message—the auctioneer—believes
that the Yes message will be sent with probability 0.5 be-
cause it knows the distribution from which the bidder’s value
is drawn. Therefore,the edge into the Yes node is labeled 0.5.
To compute the next edges, labeled 0.125 and 0.875, we
ﬁrst assume that the bidder sent a Yes response to the ﬁrst
query. The bidder will win the auction (and will be sent a
message indicating that it is assigned to the item) if and only
if no other bidder sent a Yes response to the ﬁrst query. Given
the common knowledge that bidders’ values are distributed
uniformly between 0 and 15, the probability that all three
other bidders sent a Yes query is (0.5)3 = 0.125. There-
fore, the edge incident on the Assign node is labeled 0.125,
and the edge incident on the 12 query node is labeled with its
complement 0.875.
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Figure 2: Algorithm with lowest expected information trans-
mitted for varying numbers of bidders and bins
The edges incident on the next reply nodes are labeled 0.5.
The auctioneer knows (1) that the bidder’s value was drawn
uniformlyfrom0–15bycommonknowledge;and(2)thebid-
der’s value is greater than 8 by virtue of the Yes response rep-
resented in a higher level of the tree. Therefore, the auction-
eer’s believesthat thereis a probabilityof0.5thatthe bidder’s
value is higher than 12.
The calculation of the edge labeled 0.661, incident on the
node labeled 14 in the tree, is complex and full details are
omitted. To get a feeling for why, the analysis begins with
the knowledgethat given that the bidder sent the Yes message
represented by the top of the edge, the message represented
by the node labeled 14 will be sent if and only if at least one
other bidder also has value greater than 12. But the bidder
knows that at least one other bidder had value greater than 8.
The calculation involves the bidder assigning a belief vector
representing is belief that each of one, two, and three other
bidders still remain in the auction. The value 0.661 is then
computed using this vector.
5 Results
Figure 2 indicates the algorithm that has lowest expected in-
formation transmitted for increasing numbers of bidders and
for increasingnumbersof bins. It clearly shows that choosing
the algorithm that needs least expected information transmis-
sion is highly dependent on the two parameters of the envi-
ronment. For large numbers of bidders and bins, Bisection
requires the least communication. Sealed-bid, Dutch, and
Stagedauctionseachrequiretheleast communicationforpar-
ticular parameter settings.
For a very small number of bidders and bins (fewer than
ﬁve bidders with two or four bins, and fewer than three bid-
ders with eight bins) the Sealed-bid auction performs best.
A sealed-bid auction by deﬁnition requires the maximum
amount or revelation and no coordination. Therefore, for
very small problems, the savings in revelation from any other
auction method are outweighed by the cost of coordination.2 4  8  16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
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Figure 3: Expected information transmitted per bidder for
varying numbers of bins with 60 bidders
When there are two bins, the Japanese auction has the same
communication properties as the Sealed-bid auction because
the ﬁrst and only query in the Japanese auction is always sent
and the bidder reveals its value (by its response that indicates
whether its value is in the higher or lower bin).
Forall butthesmallest numbersofbiddersandbins,theBi-
section, Dutch, and Staged Japanese auctions perform well.
The graph in Figure 3 shows the expected amount of infor-
mation transmitted between the center and each bidder for a
varying number of bins for a constant 60 bidders.
The ﬁrst thing of note on the graph is that the communica-
tion requirements of the Sealed-bin auction increase linearly
as the number of bins increases exponentially. The Sealed-
bid auction has zero coordination cost and a revelation cost
that is logarithmic in the number of bins.
Thegraphshows thatas the numberof binsincreasesexpo-
nentially, the expectedamountof communicationrequiredby
the Bisection auction rises then levels off. For a small num-
ber of bins, the Staged auction has very low communication
requirements. For small numbers of bins, the Dutch auction’s
communicationrequirementsactuallydecreaseas thenumber
of bins increase. Therefore, as the number of bins increases,
the auction with the lowest communication costs is ﬁrst the
Staged auction, then the Dutch auction and ﬁnally the Bisec-
tion auction.
6 Related Work
Economic analysis of auctions [Rasmussen, 1989, inter alia]
focuses on the effect of auction rules and prices on the strate-
gies of non-cooperative bidders. While this paper is con-
cerned with systems in which strategies can be imposed by
methods external to the auction itself, dialogue trees can be
used to measure communication requirements of all types of
auctions. In multiagent systems where the assumption of ex-
ternally imposed incentives does not hold, dialogue trees can
be used to compare the communication costs of auctions that
impose desirable incentives on the bidders.
Researchers in computerscience have used severalalterna-
tives to entropy for measuring communication in multiagent
decision making. One such approach counted the number of
messages required to arrive at a team decision [Ortiz et al.,
2003], which is equivalentto assuming that each message has
a ﬁxed length. In systems with communication channels that
carry encoded messages, the assumption that each message
hasaﬁxedlengthdoesnothold. Underaﬁxedlengthassump-
tion, the Sealed-bidauctionwouldalways be preferred. Thus,
such analyses may be misleading because an algorithm with
fewer ﬁxed-length messages will not always be the cheaper
algorithm in terms of expected information transmitted.
SunderhamandParkes [2003]measurethevolumeremain-
ing in the space of feasible private information after bidders
have sent the auctioneer constraints on their private informa-
tion in a multi-attribute auction. They use this metric to com-
pare the amount of revelation in auctions. For our purposes,
entropyis a preferredmetricbecause it providesa direct mea-
sure of bandwidth required by an auction and it provides the
common currency of bits to measure both coordination and
revelation.
Communication complexity [Kushilevitz and Nisan, 1996]
provides an alternative method for analyzing communication
between agents. Grigorieva et al. [2002] use communication
complexity to analyze the bisection auction. Communication
complexity evaluates the worst case amount of communica-
tion required for two agents to compute a function. The com-
munication complexity model assumes that sending each bi-
nary message costs one bit. If any prior information is avail-
able, it is ignored for the purposes of calculating communi-
cation complexity. As long as there is some arbitrarily small
possibility that an agent will send a ‘0’, that communication
costs one bit. Protocol trees [Yao, 1979] are used as a tool
to evaluate communication complexity of an algorithm while
dialogue trees are used to calculate expected information in a
dialogue that represents messages sent in an algorithm.
The main beneﬁt of this assumption is that there is no need
to assume a prior distribution, and that simpliﬁes the analy-
sis. The main drawback is that it assumes a particular encod-
ing of messages and therefore no savings can be attained by
alternative encodings. A system designer that relies on com-
munication complexity in choosing an auction will select an
auction that performs well under a worst case assumption of
the encoding cost of each message. In this paper, we assume
that system designers preferchoosingan auctionbased on the
expected information transmitted.
Shoham and Tennenholtz [2001] use a method related to
communication complexity for the analysis of the functions
computed in team decision-making mechanisms. They de-
ﬁne f as the maximum value of n bidders’ willingness to pay
for an item, where each bidder i has a willingness to pay of
xi. They imply that the domain of xi is continuous on the in-
terval (0,maxprice) and assume that each bidder i can com-
municate xi to the auctioneer with one bit by making use of
a common clock. They claim that by using an auction similar
to the Dutch auction, the function f can be computed by a
single bidder communicating a single bit.
In both Yao’s theory of communication complexity and
Shannon’s theory of information [Shannon, 1948], the cost
of communicating an arbitrary value drawn from a continu-
ous interval is inﬁnite, not a single bit, because there is aninﬁnite number of messages that the bidder can send to the
center. The theory of information makes assumptions that
are consistent with modern wired and wireless computer net-
works, in which messages can be encoded. Shoham and Ten-
nenholtz’ critical assumption that a continuous value may be
communicated in one bit does not hold in modern multiagent
systems.
Relying on Shoham and Tennenholtz’ assumptions would
lead a system designer to always choose their version of the
Dutch auction to minimize the amount of communication
from the bidder to the center. This paper shows that the ex-
pected amountof informationcommunicatedby an algorithm
is highlydependentonthenumberofbiddersandthedistribu-
tion of bidders’private values. The Dutch auctionis often not
the algorithmthat minimizes the expectedamountofcommu-
nication from the bidder to the center. Therefore, a system
designer that relies on Shoham and Tennenholtz’ assumption
may incur unnecessary costs.
Much prior work [Shoham and Tennenholtz, 2001; Sun-
deram and Parkes, 2003, inter alia] has centered around mea-
suring how much of a bidder’s preferences are revealed by
an algorithm instead of how much bandwidth is used by an
algorithm. Therefore, a common assumption has been that
coordinationmessages are free while revelation messages are
costly. Under that assumption, it is desirable to select an al-
gorithm with low revelation costs, even if it has high coordi-
nation costs. The results presented in Section 5 are for the
sum of revelationand coordinationcosts and differ from such
prior work for several reasons. However, situations in which
onlyonedirectionof communicationis importantcan behan-
dled easily by the models described in this paper by ignoring
the other direction in the analysis.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented three major contributions. First,
we presented an argument for measuring expected informa-
tion transmitted in a dialogue to determine the bandwidth
need by multiagent algorithms. Second, we provided a
method for measuring expected information using dialogue
trees. Third, we showed that using that method to analyze
ﬁve auctions leads to recommendations for multiagent sys-
tem design that differ from recommendations made in previ-
ouswork. Theresultsoftheanalysisindicatedthatthe correct
choice of auction depends on the number of bidders and the
size of the sample space from which bidders’ values for the
item are drawn. The Staged, Dutch, and Bisection auctions
are each appropriate for different situations, and the Sealed-
bid auction is best for very small problems. The guidelines
presented in this paper could lead to real savings in commu-
nication bandwidth with no loss in decision quality.
In future work, we plan to use dialogue trees to analyze
algorithms for more general team decision problems than
single-item assignment and for more general algorithms than
auctions. Auctions are commonly suggested for item or task
assignment in multiagent systems because they are a conve-
nient method for structuring communication between agents.
We plan to compare other methods for allocating a single
item, such as inter-agent exchange, to auctions. We assumed
that agents were honest—small adjustments to the auctions
rules instead allow us to build incentives into an auction di-
rectly. We plan to evaluate the communication costs incurred
by auctions with built-in incentives and analyze the impact of
those incentives on the correct choice of auction method.
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